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Abstract
What makes the rich different? Are they more productive, as mainstream
economists claim? I offer another explanation. What makes the rich different,
I propose, is hierarchical power. The rich command hierarchies. The poor do
not. It is this greater control over subordinates, I hypothesize, that explains the
income and class of the very rich. I test this idea using evidence from US CEOs. I
find that the relative income of CEOs increases with their hierarchical power, as
does the capitalist portion of their income. This suggests that among CEOs, both
income size and income class relate to hierarchical power. I then use a numerical
model to test if the CEO evidence extends to the US general public. The model
suggest that this is plausible. Using this model, I infer the relation between
income size, income class, and hierarchical power among the US public. The
results suggests that behind the income and class of the very rich lies immense
hierarchical power.
JEL Subject Codes: D31 (Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions); D33 (Fac-
tor Income Distribution); B5 (Current Heterodox Approaches);
Keywords: hierarchy; power; functional income distribution; personal income distri-
bution; inequality; capital as power; class
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1 Introduction
Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me.
— F. Scott Fitzgerald (1926)
Yes, they have more money.
— Ernest Hemingway (1936)
What makes the rich different? Mainstream economists think the rich are more
productive. I offer another explanation. What makes the rich different, I propose,
is hierarchical power. The rich command hierarchies. The poor do not. This
difference, I believe, is key to understanding both income and class. The purpose
of this paper is to test this idea.
My thinking is based on a simple principle. I propose that individuals tend to
use their power — their influence over others — to access resources. Of course
many political economists have had this idea before. But it has always been
difficult to test. The problem is that power is complex and multifaceted, which
means it often defies measurement. And without quantification, it is difficult to
show that power affects income (access to resources).
I argue that focusing on hierarchical power solves (at least in part) this mea-
surement problem. Within a hierarchy, the chain of command defines who has
control over whom. We can use this control over subordinates to define a sim-
ple measure of hierarchical power. This allows us to test how hierarchical power
relates to income.
And we can do more. I propose that hierarchical power also relates to class.
To understand this thinking, we must question some entrenched ideas. Politi-
cal economists usually define class in terms of the ownership of things — what
Marxists call the ‘means of production’. Capitalists own the means of production.
Laborers do not. In contrast, Nitzan and Bichler (2009) treat ownership as an
act of power. This means they focus on the ownership of institutions. Drawing
on Nitzan and Bicher’s work, I argue that ownership is an ideology that legit-
imizes hierarchy. Thus income from ownership (capitalist income) should relate
to hierarchical power.
Using these ideas, I create two joint hypotheses (Section 2). The first links
hierarchical power to income size:
Power-Income Hypothesis: Individual income is proportional to
hierarchical power.
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The second hypothesis links hierarchical power to income class — the class-based
composition of individual income:
Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis: The portion of individuals’ income
that comes from ownership is proportional to hierarchical power.
Together, these hypotheses use hierarchical power to unite the study of income
distribution. The question is, are they true?
After outlining methods (Section 3), I test these hypotheses in two ways. I
first conduct a case study of American CEOs (Section 4). I focus on CEOs be-
cause their position as corporate commanders allows a shortcut for measuring
hierarchical power. We can estimate the hierarchical power of CEOs from firm
size alone. Using this method, I find that CEOs’ income increases with hierarchi-
cal power, as does the capitalist portion of their income. Thus the CEO evidence
supports both the power-income and capitalist gradient hypotheses.
This result is promising, but also unsatisfying. We want to know if the re-
lation between CEOs’ income size, income type, and hierarchical power is also
found in the general public. Unfortunately, we lack the data to test this directly.
To get around this data shortage, I use a model to make inferences (Section 5).
The model predicts the distribution of income that should occur if CEO trends
(i.e. the relation between income size, income type, and hierarchical power) are
also found among the US public. If the predicted income distribution is consis-
tent with US data, we infer that our results plausibly extend beyond CEOs. I find
that the model predicts with reasonable accuracy the distribution of US labor in-
come, capitalist income, and total personal income. The model also predicts
the ‘hockey-stick’ relation between income size and income class (the capitalist
component of individual income). Among the top 1% or earners, the capitalist
fraction of income explodes.
Since its predictions are reasonably consistent with US data, I use the model
to make the first inference about how US income and class relate to hierarchical
power (Section 6). The results underscore Fitzgerald’s famous words that the
rich are different. Or as Tim Di Muzio writes, there is the ‘1% and the rest of us’
(2015). Not only do the 1% earn more, they are far more likely to be capitalists.
This we know from the seminal work of Thomas Piketty (2014). But what we
have lacked is a reason why income and class are related. The model suggests
a simple explanation. Behind the income and class of the very rich, I infer, lies
immense hierarchical power. This incendiary result suggests that the root of the
inequality problem may be the hierarchical power of the rich.
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1.1 The Problem
This paper is motivated by a simple problem. We have no theory that adequately
explains both income size (how much one earns) and income class (the source
of one’s income). We have three types of income theory (below). Each have
problems.
1. Core Theories: Marxist and neoclassical political economy
2. Stochastic Models: Models that generate skewed distributions using
random shocks to individual income
3. Power Theories: Mostly qualitative descriptions of how power af-
fects income
The hallmark of our core theories — Marxist and neoclassical political econ-
omy — is that they both assume value is produced. Neoclassical economists
think both laborers and capitalists produce value. Each ‘factor of production’
then earns its (marginal) contribution to output (Clark, 1899; Wicksteed, 1894).
Marxists agree that laborers produce value, but have different ideas about capi-
talists. According to Marx (1867), capitalists earn income by exploiting workers.
There are many problems with our core theories that I will not review here.1
Instead, my concern is what they conclude about personal income (i.e. the size
distribution of income). Both neoclassical and Marxist theories agree that labor
produces value, and that this is the source of labor income. Using this reasoning,
neoclassical economists (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1961) and Marx-
ists (Rubin, 1973) have concluded the same thing: if two workers earn different
incomes, they must have different productivity.2 If we generalize this reasoning,
it implies that workers’ productivity should be as unequally distributed as their
income. Yet this is not true. When workers’ productivity is measured objectively,
it fails to explain differences in income (Fix, 2018e). This leaves the labor pro-
ductivity aspect of neoclassical and Marxist theories at odds with the evidence.
1 For problems with marginal productivity theory, see Cohen and Harcourt (2003); Felipe and
Fisher (2003); Harcourt (2015); Hodgson (2005); Nitzan and Bichler (2009); Pullen (2009);
Robinson (1953); Sraffa (1960). For problems with Marxist theory, see Nitzan and Bichler
(2009); Samuelson (1971).
2 There is a subtle distinction between neoclassical and Marxist theory. Neoclassical theory
attributes labor income directly to productivity. But Marxist theory attributes income to the value
of labor power. The latter is the labor time required to reproduce labor power. Since the labor
power of more productive workers tends to take more to reproduce, more productive workers
tend to earn higher wages.
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In hindsight, this is understandable. The facts of personal income were dis-
covered after our core theories of income distribution were developed. It was
late in the 19th century when Vilfredo Pareto (1897) showed that personal in-
come was skewed and followed a power-law distribution. When these facts
became well known (in the 20th century), neoclassical and Marxist theories of
income were already firmly in place.
While political economists were slow to react to Pareto’s discovery, math-
ematicians quickly looked for processes that could generate skewed distribu-
tions. They soon found that a simple random process could do the trick. These
‘stochastic models’ assume that an individual’s income changes randomly over
time. When we apply this process to many individuals, it creates a skewed distri-
bution of income. For early models, see Champernowne (1953), Simon (1955),
and Rutherford (1955). For more recent work, see Gabaix et al. (2016), Nirei
and Aoki (2016), and Toda (2012).
These models are important because they show how the dynamics of indi-
vidual income can lead to inequality. Yet they are scientifically unsatisfying.
They do not explain the income of specific individuals — something we want an
income distribution theory to do. And since stochastic models deal only with
isolated individuals (rather than groups of individuals), they are not helpful for
understanding how income relates to class.
That brings us to income theories based on power. These are the most promis-
ing theories (in my opinion), but also the most marginalized and underdevel-
oped. An incomplete list of people who have linked income to power would
include Berle and Means (1932), Brown (1988), Commons (1924), Dugger
(1989), Galbraith (1985), Huber et al. (2017), Lenski (1966), Mills (1956),
Munkirs (1985), Nitzan and Bichler (2009), Peach (1987), Sidanius and Pratto
(2001), Tool and Samuels (1989), Tool (2017), Veblen (1904, 1923), Weber
(1978), and Wright (1979).
Power theories differ wildly in their development and scope. But the general
idea is that income inequality is caused by the concentration of power. I find this
hypothesis compelling. It avoids the trap of attributing income to productivity.
And it avoids the atomism of stochastic models. But it still has a problem. How
do we measure power? And how do we measure it in a way that relates to both
individuals and classes? This has been a major sticking point. Power surrounds
us, but it often defies measurement.
The solution, I argue, is to reduce our scope. To measure power, we focus
only on hierarchical power — the control over subordinates within a hierarchy.
We then use this limited concept of power to create a joint theory of income size
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and income class.
2 Hierarchical Power as the Basis for Income and Class
I propose that hierarchical power can explain both income size and income class.
I focus on hierarchical power for the following reasons:
1. Hierarchy is ubiquitous (Section 2.1)
2. Hierarchical power can be measured (Section 2.2)
3. Hierarchical power plausibly relates to income size (Section 2.3)
4. Hierarchical power plausibly relates to income class (Section 2.4)
2.1 Hierarchy’s Ubiquity
Price and Feinman (1995; 2010) argue that for the last 5000 years, hierarchy has
been the dominant way of organizing society. True, some traditional societies
lack formal hierarchy. But these societies still have informal ranking, if only by
sex or age (Ames, 2010).
The urge to form hierarchies likely has evolutionary origins. Virtually all so-
cial mammals form dominance hierarchies (Barroso et al., 2000; Guhl et al.,
1945; Kondo and Hurnik, 1990; Meese and Ewbank, 1973; Sapolsky, 2005;
Uhrich, 1938). In these hierarchies, high social status allows greater access to re-
sources, particularly sexual mates (Bradley et al., 2005; Cowlishaw and Dunbar,
1991; Haley et al., 1994; Girman et al., 1997; Gerloff et al., 1999; Wroblewski
et al., 2009). Given our evolutionary heritage, we expect to find similar behavior
in humans.
Unsurprisingly, studies show that when children are placed in small groups,
they quickly form hierarchies (Frankel and Arbel, 1980; Savin-Williams, 1980;
Strayer and Trudel, 1984). And like animals, humans with higher status tend
to have more children (Betzig, 1982, 2012, 2018; Cronk, 1991; Mealey, 1985).
This hints that like other animals, humans use hierarchy to distribute resources.
2.2 Measuring Hierarchical Power
In this paper, I focus on a single dimension of power — the control over subor-
dinates within a hierarchy. I call this hierarchical power. In a hierarchy, control
over subordinates is dictated by the chain of command. Superiors have power
over their direct subordinates, but also their indirect subordinates (their subor-
dinates’ subordinates). According to this definition, the more subordinates one
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6 subordinates
hierarchical power = 6 +1 = 7
Figure 1: Measuring Hierarchical Power
This figure illustrates the calculation of hierarchical power. The red individual has 6
subordinates (blue). Using Eq. 1, the hierarchical power of this person equals 7.
has, the greater one’s hierarchical power. I measure hierarchical power as pro-
portional to the total number of subordinates under one’s control:
hierarchical power = total number of subordinates+ 1 (1)
All individuals start with a power of 1, indicating they have control over
themselves. Hierarchical power is then proportional to the total number of sub-
ordinates under one’s control. Figure 1 shows an example calculation.
This definition of hierarchical power is structural — it deals only with one’s
abstract position within a hierarchy. Many other qualities might affect power,
such as a leader’s charisma, subordinates’ trust in superiors, ideologies, laws,
and so on. While important, these qualities are difficult to measure so I exclude
them. My definition of hierarchical power is also downward looking only. It
looks only at subordinates — it does not care if an individual has superiors. This
means we treat a mid-level manager in a large firm the same as a CEO in a small
firm (if they both have the same number of subordinates). We ignore the fact
that the mid-level manager takes orders but the CEO does not.
2.3 Hierarchical Power and Income
I propose that hierarchical power strongly affects income. The idea is that in-
dividuals use their power within a hierarchy to access resources. I call this the
power-income hypothesis:
Power-Income Hypothesis: Individual income is proportional to
hierarchical power (as measured by Eq. 1).
The power-income hypothesis may seem no different than an education-
income hypothesis or a race-income hypothesis (and so on). These hypotheses
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Figure 2: The Exponential Growth of Hierarchical Power with Rank
In an idealized hierarchy, the total number of subordinates (blue) grows exponentially
with hierarchical rank (red). The exact relation depends on the ‘span of control’ — the
number of subordinates directly below each superior.
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Figure 3: Average Income vs. Hierarchical Power Within Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from six firm case studies (Audas et al., 2004; Baker et al., 1993;
Dohmen et al., 2004; Lima, 2000; Morais and Kakabadse, 2014; Treble et al., 2001). The
vertical axis shows average income within each hierarchical level of the firm. Incomes
are normalized so the base-level income equals one. The horizontal axis shows average
hierarchical power of the individuals in each rank. This is equal to one plus the average
number of subordinates below a given hierarchical level. Each point represents a single
firm-year observation, and color indicates the particular case study. Grey regions around
the regression indicate the 95% prediction interval. See the Appendix and Fix (2018d)
for a detailed discussion of sources and methods.
Hierarchical Power as the Basis for Income and Class 9
all identify something that plausibly affects income. But beneath the surface,
there is a big difference. Hierarchical power is a social characteristic. You have
hierarchical power because others follow your orders. Education and race, in
contrast, are individual characteristics. They belong exclusively to the individ-
ual. Why does this matter? Because individual characteristics are constrained
by variation between individuals, which are usually small. Social characteristics
are not. This difference is important.
Let’s use an example to compare the individual characteristic of education
to the social characteristic of hierarchical power. Steve Easterbrook, the CEO
of McDonald’s, has a Bachelor’s degree. While he likely has more education
than the average McDonald’s employee, the difference is small. If the average
employee has a high-school diploma, Easterbrook would have about 30% more
years of formal education. Now consider Easterbrook’s hierarchical power. As
CEO, Easterbrook commands the entire McDonald’s workforce. In 2016, this
meant he had 375,000 subordinates. In contrast, the average McDonald’s em-
ployee likely has none. Thus Easterbrook likely has hundreds of thousands of
times more hierarchical power.
This is the crucial part of the power-income hypothesis. Hierarchical power
can vary immensely between individuals. This is because it grows exponentially
with rank (Fig. 2). If income is proportional to hierarchical power, this should
lead to vast inequalities. Returning to our example, in 2016 Steve Easterbrook
earned over 600 times the pay of an average McDonald’s employee. His enor-
mous hierarchical power can plausibly explain this disparity. His modestly better
education cannot.3
This is the reasoning behind the power-income hypothesis. But its validity is
an empirical question that I test in Sections 4 and 5. Here I review the existing
evidence. Fix (2018d) shows that income within six case-study firms is strongly
related to hierarchical power (Fig. 3). Does this relation extend to other firms,
and to the general public? I attempt to answer this question in Sections 4 and 5.
2.4 Hierarchical Power and Class
As well as explain income size, I think hierarchical power can explain income
class. To make this connection, I reflect on the ideology of power. My thinking is
heavily influenced by the work of Nitzan and Bichler (2009) and their concept
of ‘capital as power’.
3 Data for Easterbrook’s pay is from Execucomp. Data for the number of McDonald’s employ-
ees and average employee pay are from Compustat.
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Nitzan and Bichler observe that all societies have ideologies that legitimize
power. Traditional societies justify power through kinship — tracing lineage
to a common ancestor (Kirchhoff, 1955; Sahlins, 1963). Feudal societies use
religion (Hunt, 2016). Capitalist societies, according to Nitzan and Bichler, use
ownership to justify power.
In each system, the ideology does three things. First, it legitimizes the power
of rulers. Second, it justifies their income. Third, it often creates a distinct
income class for the rulers. For instance, a feudal king’s power and income are
justified by God (the divine right of kings). And as ruler, the king’s income is
given its own class — taxes.
When moving from the feudalism to capitalism, Nitzan and Bichler argue that
there is one big difference. In capitalism, the ideology of ownership legitimizes
the buying and selling of power. But the other attributes of ideology remain the
same. The ideology of ownership continues to justify the power and income of
rulers, and gives their income a separate class. Owners earn profit — a class
of income that borders on sacred in capitalism. Non-owners earn wages. Using
this reasoning, Nitzan and Bichler argue that income from ownership relates to
power. I take this reasoning and apply it to hierarchies.
Capitalist Income and Hierarchical Power
Generations of political economists have focused on the ownership of things —
what Marxists call the ‘means of production’. In contrast Nitzan and Bichler
focus on the ownership of institutions. This is the key to connecting income
class to hierarchical power.
My reasoning is best understood by a thought experiment. Imagine you buy
all the shares of a corporation. As the sole owner, you now command the corpo-
rate hierarchy. In effect, you purchased hierarchical power. Once in command
of the hierarchy, you have the power to distribute resources within it. You can
divide the firm’s income stream, keeping some for yourself and giving the rest
to your subordinates. Like the feudal king, your income gets its own class. As
owner, you earn profit (capitalist income). Those you command earn wages (la-
bor income).
This reasoning leads to a simple model of how capitalist income might re-
late to hierarchical power. Shown in Figure 4, a single owner commands the
hierarchy, and uses his/her authority to divide the firm’s income stream. The
owner earns capitalist income. Everyone else earns labor income. Expanding
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Capitalist
Capitalist Income
Labor Income
Capital
Figure 4: A Sole-Ownership Model of Capitalist Income in a Hierarchy
This figure shows how class-based income might relate to hierarchical rank. We suppose
that a capitalist is the sole owner of a firm. This gives the capitalist the legal right to
command the firm hierarchy. From this position of power, the capitalist divides the firm
income stream and pays himself/herself capitalist income (profit). Everyone else earns
labor income. Expanding on Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) concept of ‘capital as power’,
I treat ‘capital’ as the commodification of the owner’s hierarchical power.
Capitalist
Laborer
Figure 5: A Gradient Model of Capitalist Income in a Hierarchy
This figure shows a gradient model of class-based income. Ownership is distributed
among many individuals but remains connected to hierarchical power. Top-ranked indi-
viduals have large ownership shares, while bottom-ranked individuals have small own-
ership shares. Thus capitalist income fraction increases as a function of hierarchical
power. I call this the ‘capitalist gradient hypothesis’.
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on Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of ‘capital as power’, I represent capital as the
commodified ownership of the hierarchy.
A Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis
Our model in Figure 4 is intuitive, but likely too simple. The problem is that
there is only a single owner. In modern firms, partial ownership is the norm.
This means ownership is divided among many people.
Does partial ownership mean capitalists no longer control the corporate hi-
erarchy? Berle and Means (1932) thought so. They argued that diffuse owner-
ship caused capitalists to cede control to professional managers. The problem
with Berle and Means’ ‘separation thesis’ is that it assumes a dichotomy between
owners and non-owners. But the truth is that accounting practices have become
more complex. Many owners now pay themselves a salary — a non-ownership
income. And many employees earn income from stock options — a form of
ownership income.
Instead of a dichotomy, what if there is a gradient of ownership within firm
hierarchies? This would look like Figure 5. Here the firm has many owners. But
ownership is still related to hierarchical power. Those at the top have a large
ownership stake while those at the bottom have a small one. With this spread of
ownership comes a spread of capitalist income. Those at the top still earn mostly
capitalist income, and those at the bottom still earn mostly labor income. But in
between, the lines are blurred. In short, class is (at least in part) a function of
hierarchical power. I call this the ‘capitalist gradient hypothesis’:
Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis: The portion of individuals’ income that comes
from ownership is proportional to hierarchical power (as measured by Eq. 1).
We can interpret this hypothesis a few different ways. First, we can apply
it to a single firm. But this is realistic only for firms that are fully employee
owned. Such firms do exist, but are not the norm. Second, we could apply
the capitalist gradient hypothesis to employee stock ownership plans. These
give partial ownership to a firm’s employees. The problem is that employee
ownership makes up about 4% of total US market capitalization.4 Thus it is not
the main source of capitalist income.
I interpret the capitalist gradient hypothesis at the societal level. I admit
that the ownership structure of any given firm is complex. I also admit that
4 In 2017, employee ownership plans had total assets of roughly $1.3 trillion (NCEO, 2017),
while total US market capitalization was roughly $30 trillion, according to the Russel 3000 index.
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individuals earn capitalist income from a variety of firms. But at the societal
level, I hypothesize that being a capitalist is a function of hierarchical power.
That is, those who earn a large portion of their income from ownership still
tend to have a high rank in a single firm.
To make this thinking concrete, we can look at the Forbes 400 — the 400
wealthiest individuals in the US. True, most of these individuals own stocks in
many different companies. But few earned their wealth through diversified in-
vestments. Many (if not most) earned their wealth by commanding a single large
firm (Fix, 2018c). Think Bill Gates and Microsoft, Jeff Bezos and Amazon, Mark
Zuckerberg and Facebook. In other words, these individuals wield great hierar-
chical power within a single firm. The idea is that the capitalist income fraction
of these individuals is statistically related to their hierarchical power in a single
firm.
2.5 A Unified Theory of Income and Class?
I propose the power-income and capitalist gradient hypotheses as a way to unify
the study of income distribution. They tie both income size and income class to
hierarchical power. Note that these hypotheses are framed as correlations, not
causal relations. I hypothesize that both income size and capitalist income frac-
tion are proportional to hierarchical power. While this may be a causal relation,
the goal of this paper is to look for correlation only. If we find a strong correla-
tion, then future research can unpack the cause(s).
The remainder of the paper tests the power-income and capitalist gradient
hypotheses in the United States. Section 3 outlines how I define and measure
class. Section 4 tests these hypotheses using a case study of American CEOs.
Section 5 tests if CEO trends extend to the general public.
3 Methods: Classifying Income
I discuss here how I classify income to test the capitalist gradient hypothesis. I
first outline ideal ways of defining income classes (Section 3.1). I then discuss
the actual measures used in this paper (Section 3.2). To work with the available
data, I use and compare several non-ideal measures of capitalist income. As
such, empirical results should be considered preliminary.
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3.1 What is Capitalist Income?
How we classify income depends on our ideas about property and ownership.
I review here two ways of classifying income — one that makes sense from a
neoclassical standpoint, and one that makes sense if we treat ownership as a
tool for power.
In both approaches, labor income is the same. It is income that does not come
from ownership. The sticking point is capitalist income. Does capitalist income
come from any form of ownership. Or just some forms? The answer depends
on our preconceptions about property. If, like neoclassical economists, we think
property is a thing that produces value, then all ownership is the same. We
should use the class system in Table 1 and treat all property income as capitalist.
The problem with this system is that it mixes two forms of ownership —
scalable and non-scalable. Corporate ownership is scalable. Corporations range
from tiny shell companies to behemoths like Walmart. They can be any size.
But by a quirk of the law, this is not true for proprietor and rental ownership.
They are non-scalable. By definition, rent can flow only to unincorporated indi-
viduals. And proprietors are mostly the self-employed. If either a landlord or a
proprietor grows their business, they will incorporate and their income will be
reclassified as profit. By legal quirk, landlord and proprietor forms of ownership
are inherently small scale.
Why does this matter? In neoclassical theory it doesn’t. But in my theory it
does. I propose that capitalists are not simply those who own property. Instead,
capitalists are those who own hierarchy. This means we want to distinguish
between corporate and non-corporate ownership. Because corporations can be
any size, corporate owners can control hierarchies. According to my definition,
this means they are capitalists. But non-corporate owners are inherently small-
scale, so they cannot control hierarchies. Thus we give them a separate category
of small-scale ownership.
This three-class system is shown in Table 2. It is my preferred class system for
testing the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Unfortunately the available empirical
data does not (for the most part) fit cleanly into these categories. Thus I am
forced to use the non-ideal measures shown in Table 3.
3.2 Empirical Measures of Class-Based Income
I outline here the empirical measures of class income that I use to test the cap-
italist gradient hypothesis (Table 3). For detailed sources and methods, see the
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Table 1: Income Classes if all Owners are Capitalists
Income Type Symbol Definition Composition
Labor Income L
monetary returns to
non-owners
wages/salaries + pensions
Capitalist Income K1
monetary returns to
owners
distributed corporate profit + interest +
rents + proprietor income + capital gains
on all property
Table 2: Income Classes if Only Corporate Owners are Capitalists
Income Type Symbol Definition Composition
Labor Income L
monetary returns to
non-owners
wages/salaries + pensions
Small-Scale
Owner Income
monetary returns to
non-corporate ownership
rents + proprietor income + capital gains
on rental or proprietor property
Capitalist Income K2
monetary returns to
corporate ownership
distributed corporate profit + interest+
capital gains on corporate equity and bonds
‘Distributed corporate profits’ are paid to individuals. This includes dividends from M corpora-
tions and profit from S corporations.
Appendix.
Measuring the Capitalist Income of US CEOs
In Section 4, I conduct a case study of American CEOs. I use CEOs because we
can estimate their hierarchical power from firm size alone. The difficulty is that
data on CEO pay excludes some forms of capitalist income. Firms report only the
income that is considered employee compensation. This includes CEOs’ income
from stock options, but excludes income from their personal investments. Still,
stock options are a significant source of capitalist income.
Stock options allow an employee to buy corporate stock at a fixed price. The
goal is to ‘exercise’ the option (buy the stock) when the market price is higher
than the option price. The difference between the option value and the market
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Table 3: Methods for Measuring Class-Based Income in the United States
Measure Symbol Source Composition Use
Labor Income L*
World Inequality
Database (WID)
wages/salaries + pensions +
‘labor’ portion of proprietor
income
Fig. 11
Capitalist Income of
CEOs
KCEO Execucomp
realized gains from stock
options
Fig. 8, basis for
hierarchy model
Capitalist Income
(All Ownership)
K1*
World Inequality
Database (WID)
distributed corporate profit +
interest + rents + ‘capital’
portion of proprietor income +
capital gains on all property
Figs. 12 and 13
Capitalist Income
(Corporate Ownership
Only)
K2
World Inequality
Database (WID)
distributed corporate profit +
interest + capital gains on
corporate equity
Fig. 13
Notes: Pension income includes employee and employer contributions. It excludes asset income
from pension investments. ‘Distributed corporate profits’ are paid to individuals. This includes
dividends from M corporations and profit from S corporations. I focus on distributed corpo-
rate profits because I am interested in personal income. The other forms of profit (taxed profit
and retained earnings) do not flow directly to individuals. For sources and methods, see the
Appendix.
value at the exercise time is call the realized gain. This gain is taxable income
(Hopkins and Lazonick, 2016).5 Although it is not the complete picture, I use
realized gains from stock options to measure the capitalist income of CEOs.
Measuring the Distribution of US Income by Class
To measure the distribution of US income by class (Section 5), I use data from
the World Inequality Database (WID). The WID data has unparalleled depth, but
comes with some caveats.
5 I consider realized gains from stock options a form of capitalist income. However, the IRS
does not. Instead, the IRS treats stock-option income as employee compensation and taxes it at
regular income-tax rates (not capital gain rates). However, this classification has changed re-
peatedly over the last century. Hopkins and Lazonick (2016) nicely document the battle between
business and government over how stock-option income should be classified and taxed.
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WID income classes (Table 3) do not align with any of my own (Tables 1
and 2). The quirk is that WID divides proprietor income into capital and la-
bor components. This means some proprietor income is classified as labor in-
come and some is classified as capitalist income. The rationale for this division
is quintessentially neoclassical. It assumes that part of a proprietor’s income
comes from their property, and part comes from their labor. This method comes
from Piketty et al. (2017b), who are the primary source of the WID data. Piketty
et al. assign to proprietors the same capital-labor mix as the corporate sector. I
think this method is flawed, but I am stuck with the WID divisions.
The WID labor income series L* (Table 3) is like my definition L (Table 1),
but with some proprietor income mixed in. Similarly, the WID capitalist income
series K1* is like my definition K1, but with some proprietor income mixed in.
When possible, I construct my own measure of capitalist income, K2 (Table 3).
But due to WID data constraints, I can do this only for certain types of analysis.
Comparing Different Measures of Capitalist Income
As shown in Table 3, I use and compare different measures of capitalist income
throughout the paper. This is by necessity. The available data relating hierar-
chical power to income and class is scarce. To make progress, I use measures of
class-based income that are ideal , and I make comparisons between data that
are not perfectly compatible. Given the coarseness of these methods, we should
consider the results preliminary. Throughout Sections 4 and 5, I alert the reader
to the different measures that are being compared.
4 A Case Study of US CEOs
To study the relation between income, class, and hierarchical power, I conduct
a case study of US CEOs. I focus on CEOs because their role as corporate com-
mander allows a shortcut for measuring their hierarchical power (Section 4.1).
Instead of needing the whole chain of command, we can estimate CEO hierarchi-
cal power from firm size alone. Given the paucity of data on firm hierarchy, this
is an empirical boon. I use CEO data to test both the power-income hypothesis
(Section 4.2) and the capitalist gradient hypothesis (Section 4.3).
4.1 Measuring the Hierarchical Power of CEOs
To measure hierarchical power, we usually need to know a firm’s command struc-
ture. But this information is proprietary, and economists have spent little time
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31
15
7
3
1
Hierarchical
Power
1 311573Firm Size
= CEO
Figure 6: Using Firm Size to Measure the Hierarchical Power of CEOs
This figure illustrates how we can use firm size to measure the hierarchical power of
CEOs. Each hierarchy represents a different firm, with the CEO at the top (red). If firm
size is x , each CEO has x−1 subordinates. Since hierarchical power equals the number
of subordinates plus one, CEO hierarchical power is equal to firm size x .
gathering it. Fortunately, if we focus on the CEOs, there is a shortcut for mea-
suring hierarchical power.
We assume CEOs command the corporate hierarchy. This means every other
member is a subordinate. Since hierarchical power is one plus the number of
subordinates, the hierarchical power of a CEO equals the size of the hierarchy
(Fig. 6). Thus we can estimate the hierarchical power of a CEO from firm size
alone.
CEO Hierarchical power = firm size (2)
4.2 Hierarchical Power and Pay Among US CEOs
I test here if CEO income is proportional to hierarchical power (the power-
income hypothesis, Section 2.3). I look for the same power-income relation
that we found in firm case studies (Fig. 3). Quantitatively, this was
IR∝ Pβ (3)
where IR is relative income within the firm, P is hierarchical power, and β is a
regression parameter. I call β the ‘power-income exponent’, since it measures
how rapidly income increases with hierarchical power. In firm case studies, I
measured IR as income relative to the bottom hierarchical level. I would do the
same for CEOs, but we lack data for the income of bottom-ranked individuals in
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CEOs’ firms. Instead, I measure CEOs’ income relative to the average pay within
the firm. I call this the ‘CEO pay ratio’ for short.
Results are shown in Figure 7. I find that CEO pay strongly correlates with
hierarchical power (Fig. 7A). While I would like to claim this is a new discovery,
it is not. A half-century ago, David Roberts (1956) found that CEO pay increases
with firm size. While Roberts did not frame this relation in terms of hierarchical
power, his work prompted Herbert Simon (1957) to create the first model of
how hierarchy affects pay. In hindsight, Roberts’ discovery was some of the first
evidence that hierarchy shapes income. His finding holds true to this day.
On that note, Figure 7B shows that from 2006–2016, the CEO power-income
relation was relatively constant. The method works as follows. In each year, I
regress the power-income exponent β on the CEO data. The histogram then
shows the distribution of β . From 2006–2016, the relation between CEO pay
and hierarchical power was within the range 0.4< β < 0.5.
Table 4: Power-Income Exponent Among US CEOs and Within Case-Study
Firms
Power-Income Exponent (β)
US CEOs 0.45
Case-Study Firms (Fig. 3) 0.34
Notes: β is defined by Eq. 4. It measures how rapidly income
increases with hierarchical power.
With new data, we naturally want to see how it compares with existing ev-
idence. To that end, Table 4 compares the power-income relation among CEOs
to one found in the case-study firms (3). Although β estimates differ between
the two samples, this may not be statistically significant. The case-study sample
is small (6 firms), which creates sampling uncertainty. To judge the data fairly,
we need to account for this uncertainty.
To do this, we analyze the data at the firm level. For each case-study firm, we
regress the power-income exponent β . For each CEO observation, we estimate
β within the CEO’s firm using:
β =
log(IR)
log(P)
(4)
This is Eq. 3 rearranged for β . Rather than a regression on many data points,
Eq. 4 uses a single data point to estimate the power-income relation within each
A Case Study of US CEOs 20
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Figure 7: Income vs. Hierarchical Power Among US CEOs
This figure shows the relation between income and hierarchical power among US CEOs.
The hierarchical power of CEOs is measured by firm size. Panel A plots the CEO pay
ratio (CEO pay relative to the firm mean) against CEO hierarchical power. Each data
point represents a CEO. Observations cover the years 2006–2016. The line indicates a
log-log regression. Panel B shows the distribution of annual power-income exponents
over this period (Eq. 3). Panel C shows firm-level power-income exponents. Vertical
lines indicate β for each case-study firm (Fig. 3). I compare this to the distribution
of firm-level β estimates for US CEOs (Eq. 4). pt indicates the p-value of a t-test on
these two samples. pks indicates the p-value of a Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test. Both
suggest no significant difference (at the 5% level) between CEO and case-study samples.
For data sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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CEO’s firm. We use the CEO pay ratio as our measure of relative income (IR),
and firm size as our measure of CEO hierarchical power (P).
Figure 7C shows the results of this analysis. The density curve shows the
distribution of β within CEOs’ firms. Vertical lines indicate β for each case-
study firm. To compare the two samples, I use a t-test and KS-test. These tests
assume both samples come from the same population (the null hypothesis), and
return the probability of drawing two samples as different as our given samples.
According to the t-test, this probability is 16%. According the KS-test, it is 6%.
These probabilities are too large to reject the null-hypothesis. In other words, the
power-income relation among CEOs is statistically consistent with the relation
in firm case studies.
To summarize, I find strong evidence that CEO income increases with hier-
archical power. This relation is roughly constant over a ten-year period, and is
statistically consistent with the relation found in case-study firms.
4.3 Hierarchical Power and Capitalist Income Among US CEOs
I now move from looking at CEOs’ income size to looking at the capitalist portion
of their income. I test if this portion increases with hierarchical power (the
capitalist gradient hypothesis, Section 2.4).
I define the capitalist income of CEOs as the realized gains from stock options.
I then measure the capitalist fraction of total income:
Capitalist Fraction of CEO Income =
Realized Gains from Stock Options
Total Compensation
(5)
As shown in Figure 8, I find that the capitalist fraction of CEO income in-
creases with hierarchical power. Quantitatively, the relation can be modeled as
Kfrac = κ log(P) (6)
where Kfrac is the capitalist fraction of income, P is hierarchical power, and κ is a
free parameter. I call κ the ‘capitalist gradient slope’, as it measures how rapidly
the capitalist fraction of income increases with hierarchical power.
The raw correlation between the capitalist fraction of income and hierarchi-
cal power is not large (R2 = 0.03), but is highly statistically significant (p <
10−10). In other words, the trend is important but noisy. The relation is also
consistent over time. Figure 8B regresses κ onto annual CEO data and plots the
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Figure 8: Capitalist Fraction of Income vs. Hierarchical Power Among US
CEOs
This Figure shows how the capitalist fraction of CEOs’ total income relates to their hi-
erarchical power (measured using firm size). Panel A shows average trends between
2006–2016. Results are for roughly 20,000 US CEOs. The line and shaded region indi-
cate the median and interquartile range (respectively). The dotted line is the regressed
trend (a log-linear regression with y-intercept fixed to 0). Panel B shows the distribution
of the capitalist-gradient slope κ (Eq. 6) over the years 2006–2016. For data sources
and methods, see the Appendix.
distribution over 2006–2016. As with the power-income relation (Fig. 7C), the
capitalist gradient relation is consistent over time.
To summarize, I find that CEOs with more hierarchical power tend to earn
a larger portion of their income from ownership. This suggests that, at least
among CEOs, being a capitalist is a function of hierarchical power.
4.4 CEO Case-study Summary
The evidence indicates that both the income size and income class of CEOs are
functions of hierarchical power. This supports the power-income and capitalist
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gradient hypotheses. But since CEOs are a unique group, we must be careful
about inferring too much from them alone. To draw more general conclusions,
we need to test if CEO trends extend to the general public. Because we lack data
on hierarchical power for the general public, I use a model to conduct this test
(Section 5).
5 From CEOs to the General Public: Extending the Evidence
To test if there is a general relation between income, class, and hierarchical
power in the United States, I propose the following method:
Assume CEO trends
extend to the general public
Model the implied
distribution of income
Compare to the actual
distribution of income
This test works by inference. We use a model (Section 5.1) to predict the
distribution of US income that should occur if CEO trends are also found among
the general public. If the model’s predictions are correct, we can infer the gen-
eral relation between income, class, and hierarchical power (without actually
observing it). I find that the model’s predictions are generally consistent with
US data. Within its range of uncertainty, the model correctly predicts the size
distribution of US income by class (Section 5.2). It also predicts, with reason-
able accuracy, the relation between income size and income class (Section 5.3).
This suggests that CEO trends extend to the general public. I discuss the conse-
quences in Section 6.
5.1 Using A Model to Extrapolate CEO Trends
To extrapolate the CEO evidence to the general public, I use a numerical model
developed in Fix (2018c). This ‘hierarchy model’ takes the CEO data as an input
(as well as the firm case-study data) and then predicts the distribution of income
that should occur if CEO trends extend to the US public. I use the word ‘pre-
dict’ here sincerely. The model’s parameters are determined entirely by firm-level
data. The model then predicts the macro distribution of income — an indepen-
dent phenomenon. I do not ‘tune’ the model’s parameters to produce desired
results.
I discuss here the hierarchy model’s conceptual structure. See the Appendix
and Fix (2018c) for technical details.
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The Conceptual Structure of the Hierarchy Model
The hierarchy model takes what we know from CEOs, and fills in the gaps for
the rest of the population. The model has three conceptual steps, shown in
Table 5. In Step 1, the model simulates the hierarchical structure of CEOs’ firms.
In Step 2, the model generalizes this simulation to a more representative size
distribution of firms. In Step 3, the model simulates class-based income. The
result is a predicted distribution of US income by class.
Step 1: Simulate the hierarchical structure of CEOs’ firms. The model be-
gins with what we know. We have data on firm size and CEO pay for a sample
of US firms. We also know the hierarchical structure of six case-study firms (Fig.
3). The model combines these two datasets to simulate the hierarchical structure
of CEOs’ firms. To simulate the employment hierarchy, the model assumes that
CEOs’ firms have the same hierarchical ‘shape’ as case-study firms. The model
then uses the CEO pay ratio to infer the pay hierarchy within each CEO’s firm.
The result is a simulation of the hierarchical structure of CEOs’ firms.
Step 2: Generalize the simulation to the US firm population. We cannot
end with Step 1 because the sample of CEOs’ firms is size-biased — it contains
more large firms than the US firm population. To draw accurate conclusions,
we must extend our simulation to the correct size distribution of firms. We do
this by analyzing our simulation of CEO firms. We observe how firm mean pay
is distributed, and how hierarchical pay changes with firm size. We fit functions
to these trends. Armed with these functions, we create a new simulation that
replicates the US firm size distribution. We then use this general model to predict
the distribution of US personal income.
Step 3. Simulate class-based income. Having simulated personal income,
the last step is to divide individuals’ income into class components. We assume
that the relation between the capitalist fraction of CEOs’ income and their hier-
archical power (Fig. 8A) extends to the general public. We model the capitalist
fraction of individuals’ income using Eq. 6, setting the capitalist gradient slope
(κ) to the one found in CEOs. We then define the labor fraction of individuals’
income (Lfrac) as the complement of the capitalist fraction:
Lfrac = 1− Kfrac (7)
The goal here is to simulate a two-class system of income, as in Table 1.
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Figure 9: A Landscape View of the US Hierarchy Model
This figure visualizes the US hierarchy model as a landscape of three-dimensional firms.
The model extrapolates CEO data to create a simulation of how income and class relate
to hierarchical power in the United States. Each pyramid represents a single firm, with
size indicating the number of employees and height corresponding to the number of
hierarchical levels. Panel A uses color to indicate income relative to the median. Panel
B uses shades of red to indicate the capitalist fraction of individuals’ income. This visual
shows 20,000 firms. The actual model uses 1 million firms to simulate the US firm
population.
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Table 5: The Hierarchy Model’s Conceptual Structure
What We Know What We Do Not Know Simulation
Step 1
• CEO pay-ratio and firm
size for a large sample of
US firms
• Hierarchical structure of
6 case-study firms
The hierarchical
employment and pay
structure within CEO firms
Simulate the hierarchical
structure of ‘CEO firms’*
Step 2 Simulated hierarchical
structure of CEO firms
How this size-biased
simulation of CEO firms
generalizes to the US firm
population
• Simulate the hierarchical
structure of the whole US
firm population
• Predict the distribution
of personal income
Step 3 Simulated personal income
US population
Class-based income of
individuals
Simulate class-based
income using the CEO
capitalist gradient
Model Output • Simulation of US personal and class-based income distribution• Simulated relation between income size, income type, and hierarchical power
* ‘CEO firms’ refers to the sample of US firms for which we know the CEO pay ratio and
firm size (Fig. 7)
Model Output. Figure 9 visualizes the model’s output as a landscape, with
firms displayed as pyramids. We can see the main features of the model here.
Income increases rapidly with hierarchical rank (Fig. 9A), as does the capitalist
fraction of income (Fig. 9B). We can also see the size distribution of firms. Most
firms are small, but there are a few behemoths. It’s at the pinnacle of these large
firms that we find most top earners and capitalists.
5.2 Model Predictions: The Size Distribution of US Income By Class
I test here the model’s predictions for the size distribution of income by class.
Figures 10–12 show the results. Each figure compares model predictions to US
data over the years 2006–2014. Income distribution metrics are defined in Ta-
ble 6. Figure 10 shows the distribution of total personal income, Figure 11 shows
labor income, and Figure 12 shows capitalist income. A reminder to the reader
that the model and the US data use incommensurate definitions of class (see
Table 3). The model is based on CEO data, which defines capitalist income in
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terms of the realized gains on stock options. US capitalist income includes all
forms of property income (except a portion of proprietor income).
I first test the model’s predictions using three summary statistics of inequality
(Figs. 10–12, Panels A–C). I use the Gini index, the top 1% share, and the power-
law exponent of the top 1%. Each metric is sensitive to a different aspect of the
distribution. The Gini index is sensitive to the body of the distribution. The top
1% share is more sensitive to the distribution tail. The power-law exponent is
sensitive only to the distribution tail. When measured with these statistics, the
model is quite accurate. The average error is less than 11% (Table 7).
I also test the model by visualizing the income distribution (Figs. 10–12,
Panels D–G). The probability density (Panel D) visualizes the body of the distri-
bution. For all three classes of income, the model reproduces the essential form
of the distribution body. I use the complementary cumulative distribution (Panel
G) to visualize the behavior of top incomes. Again, the model’s predictions are
roughly consistent with US data. By this, I mean that the US data lies within the
model’s range of uncertainty.
While the model’s predictions are generally consistent with US data, there is
one area of failure. The model predicts too few people with small incomes. This
is visible in the probability density function (Panel D) as a divergence between
the model and the US data as income approaches zero. This divergence is visible
in the cumulative distribution (Panel F) as differing y-intercepts between the
model and US data.
The prevalence of small labor and personal income in the US is likely caused
by unemployment and non-employment. Many US individuals do little paid work,
either by choice or by circumstance. This non-employment is not part of the
hierarchy model. Why? The model extrapolates corporate data, which is biased
towards the full-time employed. Thus the model’s under-prediction of small
incomes is likely due to factors it excludes.
For capitalist income, the problem is slightly different. The model assumes
that the capitalist fraction of individual income is an exact function of hierar-
chical power. This means that individuals with the same number of subordi-
nates have exactly the same capitalist income fraction. This leaves no room for
small variations in rates of return or the size of investment. For small capital-
ist incomes, this variation likely dominates income dispersion and cannot be
neglected.
To summarize, the model’s predictions for the US distribution of income by
class are generally consistent with the US data. The only consistent failure is
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Table 6: Definitions of Income Distribution Metrics
Metric Definition and Sensitivity
Gini index A measure of inequality ranging from 0 (perfect
equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The Gini index is
sensitive to the body of the distribution.
top 1% share A measure of inequality — the income fraction held
by the top 1% of earners. The top 1% share is more
sensitive to the distribution tail than the Gini index.
power-law exponent (α) The fitted power-law exponent for the top 1% of in-
comes. The exponent α indicates that the probability
of finding someone with income x is proportional to
1/xα. The power-law exponent is sensitive only to
the tail of the distribution. A smaller exponent indi-
cates a ‘fatter’ tail.
income probability density Indicates the probability of finding an individual with
the given income. Visualizes the body of the distribu-
tion.
Lorenz curve Shows the cumulative fraction of income held by in-
dividuals with income below the given percentile. A
straight line indicates perfect inequality.
cumulative distribution The curve indicates the fraction of individuals with in-
come less than the given x value. Visualizes the body
of the distribution.
complementary cumulative
distribution
The fraction of individuals with income greater than
the given x value. Visualizes the tail of the distribu-
tion. When plotted on log-log scales, the slope of the
tail relates to the power-law exponent (slope= α−1).
an under-prediction of small incomes. We can plausibly attribute this error to
factors that the model excludes.
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Figure 10: Personal Income Distribution —Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of total personal income. Each panel compares the
hierarchy model’s prediction to US data. Metrics are defined in Table 6. Income in
Panels D, F and G is normalized so the median is 1. In Panel G, the shaded region shows
the approximate threshold for the top 1% of incomes. US data comes from the World
Inequality Database. The hierarchy model is stochastic and varies between iterations. I
show the model’s 95% range. For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
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Figure 11: Labor Income Distribution — Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of labor income. Each panel compares the hierarchy
model’s prediction to US data. Metrics are defined in Table 6. Income in Panels D, F and
G is normalized so the median is 1. In Panel G, the shaded region shows the approx-
imate threshold for the top 1% of incomes. US data comes from the World Inequality
Database, using class definitions L1* (Table 3). The hierarchy model is stochastic and
varies between iterations. I show the model’s 95% range. For sources and methods, see
the Appendix.
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Figure 12: Capitalist Income Distribution — Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of capitalist income. Each panel compares the hierar-
chy model’s prediction to US data. Metrics are defined in Table 6. Income in Panels D, F
and G is normalized so the median is 1. In Panel G, the shaded region shows the approx-
imate threshold for the top 1% of incomes. US data comes from the World Inequality
Database, using class definitions K1* (Table 3). The hierarchy model is stochastic and
varies between iterations. I show the model’s 95% range. For sources and methods, see
the Appendix.
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Figure 13: The Capitalist Income Hockey Stick — Model Predictions vs. US
Data
This figure shows the capitalist income ‘hockey stick’ — the relation between the capi-
talist fraction of income and income percentile. I use two different measures of US capi-
talist income — K1* and K2* (see Table 3). Panel A uses a linear scale on the horizontal
axis. Panel B shows the same data with a reverse logarithmic scale on the horizontal
axis. Shaded regions indicate the 95% range of the data. Lines indicate the median. US
data covers the years 2006–2014. For sources and methods, see the Appendix.
From CEOs to the General Public: Extending the Evidence 33
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Inequality — Model Predictions vs. US Data
Metric Source
Labor
Income
Personal
Income
Capitalist
Income
Gini Index (mean) US 0.54 0.61 0.87
Model 0.49 0.51 0.87
Top 1% Share (mean) US 0.14 0.20 0.38
Model 0.13 0.16 0.48
Power Law Exponent (mean) US 2.82 2.57 2.42
Model 2.90 2.73 2.28
average model error =10.9%
This table compares model predictions to US data using the average of three different summary
statistics of inequality. For the US, this is the mean between 2006–2014. For the model, it is the
mean over many iterations. ‘Average model error’ indicates the mean percentage error of the
model for all the statistics shown in this table.
5.3 Model Predictions: The Capitalist Income ‘Hockey Stick’
Next I test the model’s predicted relation between income size and income class.
Figure 13 shows the results, plotting the capitalist fraction of income against
income percentile. I call this the capitalist income ‘hockey stick’ because of its
similarity to the famous hockey-stick graph showing exploding temperatures in
the 20th century (Mann et al., 1999). Here it is capitalist income that explodes
among top earners.
In Figure 13, I compare the model to two measures of US capitalist income.
I continue using capitalist income K1* (as in Figures 10–12), which includes
income from all forms of property. But I also calculate capitalist income K2*,
which includes only income from interest and corporate equity (see Table 3).
A reminder to the reader that the model’s definition of class income are tech-
nically not compatible with the US data. The model is based on CEO data, which
measures capitalist income from the realized gains on stock options (Table 3).
Overall, the model’s predictions fair well. The model correctly predicts the
explosion of capitalist income among top earners. Viewed on a linear scale (Fig.
13A), the model’s prediction is very close to US capitalist income K2*. There is
a discrepancy among the bottom 50% where the WID data allows negative in-
comes (from debt). Since the model does not allow negative incomes, it cannot
reproduce this behavior. When we view the trends on a logarithmic scale (Fig.
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13B), the model still fairs well. But this time we see a discrepancy beginning in
the top 0.1%. The model predicts too little capitalist income for these top earn-
ers. While not perfect, the model’s predictions are consistent with the general
form of US data.
Given the model’s success, an element of the empirical data becomes more
significant. The trend in the capitalist fraction of income is driven by interest
and corporate equity (shown in K2*). We know this because including rent and
proprietor income (in K1*) does not significantly change the trend. Why is this
important? Because I argued that only corporate income should relate to hier-
archy (Section 3). Thus, if a trend in capitalist income is due to hierarchy, it
should be most visible in corporate data. Now we find that the trend in corpo-
rate income is consistent with the trend we expect if hierarchical power relates
to income and class among the general public.
5.4 Extending Evidence – A Summary
To summarize, I have used a model to test if the CEO relation between hierar-
chical power, income, and class extends to the general public. The test works
by inference. The model predicts the distribution of income that should occur
if CEO trends generalize to the US public. We then test this prediction by com-
paring it to US data. The results are promising. The model’s predictions are
generally consistent with the US data. This suggests that among the US public,
income and class are a function of hierarchical power.
6 Inferences: How the Rich Are Different
We are now in a position to investigate our primary question: how are the rich
different? Mainstream economists think the rich are more productive. Instead,
I have proposed that the rich are different because of their hierarchical power.
The rich command hierarchies. The poor do not.
We can now use our model to infer if this is true in the United States. To
reiterate, the model predicts how income and class should relate to hierarchi-
cal power if CEO trends extend to the US public. Having established that this
extension is plausible (Section 5), we can now go one step further. We use our
model to make the first estimate of how income and class relate to hierarchical
power in the United States. The results are shown in Figure 14.
Our inference indicates a startling division in the US population. Or perhaps
chasm is a better word. The model suggests that the vast majority of Americans
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Figure 14: Hierarchical Power — How the Rich Are Different
This figure shows the inferred three-way relation between income size, income class,
and hierarchical power among the US public. Results are from the hierarchy model,
which extrapolates CEO trends to the general public (Section 5). The plot shows the
average hierarchical power of individuals, grouped by income percentile. The average
capitalist fraction of income is indicated by color. Lines indicate different model itera-
tions. Note the log scale on the y-axis. The maximum hierarchical power in the model
corresponds to a single individual commanding a firm of roughly 2 million employees
— the current size of Walmart.
have virtually no hierarchical power. Yet among the top 1% there is an explo-
sion of hierarchical power — a veritable wall of power. This reinforces Tim Di
Muzio’s (2015) distinction between ‘1% and the rest of us’. There seems to be a
chasm of hierarchical power separating the two groups. Note that in Figure 14,
hierarchical power is plotted on a logarithmic scale. This actually compresses
the magnitude of the explosion. According to the model, top earners can have
hundreds of thousands of times more hierarchical power than the poor.
And it is not just income, but also class that changes with hierarchical power.
The capitalist fraction of income increases with hierarchical power. In other
words, the rich have more hierarchical power, and they are more likely to be
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capitalists. In short, our inference suggests that in the United States, hierarchical
power potentially unifies the study of income and class.
6.1 Open Questions
The inferred relation between income, class and hierarchical power raises many
questions for the future. First, we want to know if our inference is correct.
Does it represent the actual relation between hierarchical power, income and
class among the US public? Answering this question requires better data. It re-
quires that more researchers be interested in studying the hierarchical structure
of firms.
Second, there is the matter of causation. The goal of this paper has been to
test for a correlation between hierarchical power and income size and income
class. I have left the study of causation for future research. Unlike neoclassical
theory, a power theory of income acknowledges that income is a social phe-
nomenon. This means causation is complex. Many different factors are likely at
work.
In despotic hierarchies (such as slave plantations), the chain of command
may operate through brute force. But in less despotic hierarchies, ideology is
likely more important. I have argued that the ideology legitimizes both the
authority and income of superiors, and gives this income its own class. Un-
derstanding the ideologies of power is no small task. Generations of political
economists have studied it, with no consensus in sight (Berle and Means, 1932;
Brown, 1988; Commons, 1924; Dugger, 1989; Galbraith, 1985; Lenski, 1966;
Mills, 1956; Munkirs, 1985; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009; Peach, 1987; Sidanius
and Pratto, 2001; Tool and Samuels, 1989; Tool, 2017; Veblen, 1904, 1923; We-
ber, 1978; Wright, 1979). I leave the difficult task of untangling causation for
future research.
Second, there is the question of the ‘boundaries’ of hierarchy. I have focused
here on hierarchy within firms. But hierarchies can also extend between firms
— what Bichler and Nitzan (2017) call “meso hierarchies”. This involves the
use of partial ownership to wield control over firms. Interesting work on corpo-
rate ownership has revealed that investment firms wield a surprising amount of
power (Glattfelder and Battiston, 2009; Glattfelder, 2010; Vitali et al., 2011).
Understanding how this network of ownership relates to hierarchical power is
an important task for future research. It suggests that owners of investment
firms may have far greater hierarchical power than the (small) size of their firm
indicates.
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Third, we want to know if our results extend beyond the United States. At
present, we do not know. But the methods used here could easily be applied
to other countries. This would involve testing if hierarchical power relates to
income and class among non-American CEOs. We could then use the hierarchy
model to test if CEO trends extend to the general public (in each country). If
they do, we would use the model to infer the relation between income, class,
and hierarchical power.
Fourth, we want to know if the relation between income, class and hierar-
chical power has changed over time. Again, we have no direct evidence. But
there is indirect evidence that the recent growth of US top incomes is due to a
redistribution of income within firm hierarchies. In a landmark study, Song et al.
(2016) find that the recent growth of US top incomes is due mostly to increas-
ing inequality within firms. Using a similar model as here, I have found that the
growth of top incomes may be due to a redistribution of income towards the
tops of firm hierarchies (Fix, 2018b).
Fifth, we want to know if a relation between income, class and hierarchical
power extends to non-capitalist societies. I think it should. I have proposed the
power-income hypothesis as a universal principle of resource distribution. The
rationale is that the desire to use power for personal gain is deeply imprinted on
the human psyche. The reasons may be Darwinian. Laura Betzig (1982; 2012;
2018) argues that we (mostly males) seek hierarchical power as a means for
achieving reproductive success. While we know little about hierarchy in pre-
capitalist societies, we can use a model to project modern trends into the past.
Doing so suggests that the growth of hierarchy can possibly explain the origin
and evolution of inequality (Fix, 2018a). Again, this is a model-based inference,
but it suggests that income plausibly increases with hierarchical power in pre-
capitalist societies.
What about the relation between hierarchy and class? Obviously class types
change in different societies. But my general hypothesis is that in societies with a
mature class system, the income of elites should relate to the ideology of power.
Admittedly we have very little data on this topic. But consider how Reinhard
Bendix describes the relation between authority, income and property rights in
German feudal society:
... governmental functions were usable rights which could be sold or leased
at will. For example, judicial authority was a type of property. The person
who bought or leased that property was entitled to adjudicate disputes and
receive the fees and penalties incident to such adjudication. (Bendix, 1980, p.
149)[emphasis added]
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If we paraphrase Bendix, we arrive at the same reasoning that I used to derive
the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Building on the work of Nitzan and Bichler
(2009), I suggested that ‘capitalist authority’ is a ‘type of property’. The person
who buys this property is ‘entitled’ to wield hierarchical power and ‘receive in-
come’ in return. This reasoning led to hypothesis that the capitalist portion of
income should increase with hierarchical power. Of course, Bendix’s description
hardly means that class is a function of hierarchical power in feudal societies.
But it suggests that class-based income in modern societies might not be as dif-
ferent from feudal societies as we would like to think.
To summarize, the study of how hierarchical power relates to income and
class is in its infancy. Many questions remain un-investigated and unanswered.
But the results here are promising. It seems plausible that, at least in the United
States, hierarchical power can help unify the study of income distribution.
7 Conclusions
This paper is proposes an alternative to orthodox theories of income distribu-
tion. For more than a century, neoclassical and Marxist theories have been the
dominant ways of explaining income. Both assume that value is produced. Un-
fortunately, accepting this idea makes it difficult to explain the skewed distri-
bution of personal income. As long as neoclassical and Marxist ideas remain
entrenched, I believe the study of income distribution will stagnate. To echo
Nitzan and Bichler (2012), we need a “radical Ctrl-Alt-Del”. The goal of this
paper has been to chart a new course for studying income and class.
Like any complex phenomenon, income size and income class probably have
many causes. But if we want to focus on only one correlate, I have proposed it
should be hierarchical power — the control over subordinates within a hierarchy.
This, I have argued, is the key factor that separates the rich from the poor. The
rich own and command hierarchies. The poor do not. To connect income and
class to hierarchical power, I have proposed two related hypotheses. First, indi-
vidual income increases with hierarchical power (the power-income hypothesis,
Section 2.3). Second, the capitalist portion of income increases with hierarchical
power (the capitalist gradient hypothesis, Section 2.4).
Evidence from US CEOs supports these hypotheses (Section 4). Among CEOs,
income increases with hierarchical power, as does the capitalist portion of this
income. Since CEOs are a unique group, I used a model to test if CEO trends
extend to the general public (Section 5). While preliminary, the results of this
test suggest that there is a general, three-way relation between income size, in-
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come class and hierarchical power among the US public. I then used the model
to infer what this relation looks like (Section 6). Behind the income and class
of the very rich, the model suggests, lies immense hierarchical power.
Because it is an opening salvo, the research here uses sparse and often non-
ideal data. But while preliminary, the evidence suggests that hierarchical power
provides a plausible basis for unifying the study of income class. The task for
the future is to subject this idea to more rigorous testing.
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Appendix
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work:
https://osf.io/wp8yu/
The supplementary materials include:
1. Source data;
2. Code for all analysis;
3. Hierarchy model code.
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A US Class-Based Income
Data for US class-based income comes from the World Inequality Database (WID).
I use this data in Figures 10–13. My income measures are shown in Table 8.
These are composed of the WID data series shown in Tables 9 and 10. I use two
WID series to construct K1*, L1*, and T. This means I merge statistics from both
WID series.
The WID data comes from Piketty et al. (2017b). For the methods of this
study, see Piketty et al. (2017a). This is the most detailed study to date of US
class-based income. However, it comes with some caveats. Piketty et al. sub-
divide proprietor income into capitalist and labor components. The capitalist
component is series fkbus. The labor component is series flmil (Table 10). Oddly,
I cannot find an explicit statement of the methods behind this split in Piketty’s
work. According to Rognlie (2016), Piketty assumes that proprietor income “has
the same net capital share as the corporate sector”.
This leads to a difference between my definitions of class-based income (Ta-
ble 1) and the empirical data (Table 8). My two-class definition of capitalist
income (K1) includes all proprietor income. In contrast, the empirical measure
K1* contains only a portion of proprietor income. My definition of labor in-
come (L1) contains no proprietor income. In contrast, the empirical measure
L1* contains a portion of proprietor income.
In addition to the capitalist income series provided by WID, I construct my
own series K2 shown in Table 8. This includes equity and interest income (with
capital gains). It corresponds to capitaist income K2, defined in Table 2.
Methods for Estimating Income Distribution Statistics
WID provides three types of data that I use to compute statistics:
1. Income percentile (bin)
2. Income share (by income percentile bin)
3. Income threshold (by income percentile bin)
As an example, the WID data may indicate that percentiles P99–P100 have
an income share of 15%. This means the top 1% holds 15% of all income. The
income threshold for this bin may be $200,000. This means that the lowest
income of the top 1% is $200,000.
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Table 8: Measures of US Class-Based Income
Measure Symbol Composition
Capitalist Income
(All Ownership)
K1* both fkinc and pkinc
Capitalist Income
(Scalable Ownership
Only)
K2 fkequ + fkfix
Labor Income L1* both flinc and plinc
Total Income T both fainc and ptinc
Table 9: World Inequality Database Main Series
Series Description Composition
fainc Personal factor income flinc + fkinc
fkinc Personal factor capital income fkhou + fkequ + fkfix + fkbus + fkpen + fkdeb
flinc Personal factor labor income flemp + flmil + flprl
pkinc Personal pre-tax capital income fkinc + pkpen + pkbek
plinc Personal pre-tax labor income flinc + plcon + plbel
ptinc Personal pre-tax income plinc + pkinc
Table 10: World Inequality Database Component Series
Series Description
fkbus Business asset income
fkdeb Interest payments
fkequ Equity asset income
fkfix Interest income
fkhou Housing asset income
fkpen Pension and insurance asset income
flemp Compensation of employees
flmil Labor share of net mixed income
flprl Sales and excise taxes falling on labor
pkbek Capital share of social insurance income
pkpen (Minus) Investment income payable to pension funds
plbel Labor share of social insurance income
plcon (Minus) social contributions
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Gini Index: I estimate the Gini index by constructing a Lorenz curve from WID
data. The Gini index equals the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of
perfect equality, divided by the total area under the line of perfect equality.
Top 1% Share: This is provided directly by the WID data.
Power-Law Exponent: I estimate the power-law exponent of the top 1% of in-
comes using income percentile and threshold data. I create binned data where
we know the proportion of people in each bin, and the income boundaries of
each bin. I then use the method discussed in Virkar and Clauset (2014) to esti-
mate the power-law exponent from this binned data.
Probability Density: I estimate the probability density using income percentile
and threshold data. I first normalize income threshold data so that the median
equals 1. I then construct a cumulative distribution. This is the fraction of
individuals below a given income. I estimate the probability density function
from the slope of the cumulative distribution.
Lorenz Curve: The Lorenz curve is constructed from income percentile and
income share data. It is the cumulative share of income vs. income percentile.
Cumulative Distribution: I construct the cumulative distribution from income
percentile and threshold data. I normalize income threshold data so that the
median equals 1.
Complementary Cumulative Distribution: I construct the complementary cu-
mulative distribution (CCD) from the cumulative distribution (CD). The y-value
for the CCD is 1 minus the corresponding y-value for the CD.
Capitalist Income Share vs. Percentile: Capitalist income share K1∗frac is cal-
culated by merging two series:
K1∗frac =
(
fkinc / fainc
pkinc / ptinc
(8)
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Capitalist income share K2∗frac is calculated as:
K2∗frac = (fkequ+ fkfix) / fainc (9)
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B Case-Study Firms
I review here the evidence from firm case studies that informs the hierarchy
model. Table 11 summarizes the source data, while Figure 15 shows the hier-
archical employment and pay structure of these firms. The firms remain anony-
mous, and are named after the authors of the case-study papers. Although the
exact shapes vary, the employment structure of each firm has a rough pyramid
shape. The pay structure of each firm has an inverse pyramid shape.
Figure 16 dissects these trends. Figure 16A shows how the span of control
(the employment ratio between adjacent ranks) changes as a function of hier-
archical level. In these firms, the span of control is not constant, but instead
tends to increase with hierarchical rank. Similarly, Figure 16B shows the ratio of
mean pay between adjacent ranks. Like the span of control, the pay ratio tends
to increase with hierarchical rank. Lastly, Figure 16C shows income dispersion
within hierarchical ranks of each firm (measured with the Gini index). Note that
income dispersion within ranks is quite low and there is no evidence of a trend.
The case-study data plays a central role in the hierarchical model developed
in this paper. From the case-study evidence, I propose the following ‘stylized’
facts:
1. The span of control tends to increase with hierarchical level.
2. The inter-level pay ratio tends to increase with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-level income inequality is approximately constant across all hierar-
chical levels.
The case-study evidence informs the basic structure of the model, and also
some of its key parameters. The ‘shape’ of modeled firm hierarchies is deter-
mined from the fitted span-of-control trend shown in Figure 16A. Figure 17
shows the idealized employment hierarchy that is implied by case-study data. Er-
ror bars indicate uncertainty, calculated using the bootstrap resampling method.
Parameters for income dispersion within ranks are determined from the mean
of data in Figure 16C. For a detailed discussion of the model algorithm and
parameter-fitting procedure, see Sections D and E.
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A.  Firm Hierarchical Employment Structure
B.  Firm Hierarchical Pay Structure
Figure 15: The Hierarchical ‘Shape’ of Six Different Case-Study Firms
This figure shows the hierarchical employment and pay structure of six different case-
study firms. Panel A shows the hierarchical structure of employment, while Panel B
shows the hierarchical pay structure.
Case-Study Firms 47
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
Exponential
Regression
log scale
0.5
1.0
2.0
5.0
10.0
20.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Hierarchical Level
Sp
an
 o
f C
on
tro
l
A.  Span of Control By Hierarchical Level
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l l
l
l
l
l l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Exponential
Regression
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Hierachical Level
Su
pe
rio
r−
Su
bo
rd
in
at
e 
Pa
y 
Ra
tio
B.  Pay Ratio By Hierarchical Level
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l
l
l
Mean
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Hierarchical Level
G
in
i I
nd
ex
C.  Income Dispersion Within Each Level
Sources:  
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Audas et al.       
Baker et al.      
Dohmen et al.       
Grund       
Limi       
Morais & Kakabadse       
Treble et al.       
Figure 16: Analyzing the Hierarchical Structure of Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from 7 case-study firms. Note that Grund (2005) appears in
this figure, but not in Figures 15. This is because Grund does not provide data for
employment by hierarchical rank (see Tbl. 11). Panel A shows how the span of con-
trol (the subordinate-to-superior employment ratio between adjacent levels) varies with
hierarchical level. Note the log scale on the y-axis. Panel B shows how the superior-
to-subordinate pay ratio varies with hierarchical level. In Panels A and B, the x-axis
corresponds to the upper hierarchical level in each corresponding ratio. Panel C shows
the Gini index of income inequality within each hierarchical level. Different case-study
firms are indicated by color, with names indicating the study author. Note that hori-
zontal ‘jitter’ has been introduced in all three plots in order to better visualize the data
(hierarchical level is a discrete variable). The lines in Panels A and B indicate exponen-
tial regressions, while the line in Panel C shows the average Gini index. Grey regions
correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 11: Summary of Firm Case Studies
Source Years Country Firm Levels
Span of
Control
Level
Income
Level Income
Dispersion
Audas et al. (2004) 1992 Britain All ! !
Baker et al. (1993) 1969-1985 United States Management ! ! !
Dohmen et al. (2004) 1987-1996 Netherlands All ! ! !
Grund (2005) 1995 & 1998 US and Germany All ! !
Lima (2000) 1991-1995 Portugal All ! ! !
Morais and Kakabadse (2014)∗ 2007-2010 Undisclosed All ! !
Treble et al. (2001) 1989-1994 Britain All ! ! !
Notes: This table shows metadata for the firm case studies displayed in Fig. 16. The ‘Firm
Levels’ column refers to the portion of the firm that is included in the study. ‘Management’
indicates that only management levels were studied.
∗I discard (as an outlier) the bottom hierarchical level in Morais and Kakabadse’s data.
Uncertainty in
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Figure 17: Idealized Firm Employment Hierarchy Implied by Case Studies
This figure shows the idealized firm hierarchy that is implied by fitting trends to case-
study data (Fig. 16A). Error bars show the uncertainty in the hierarchical shape, calcu-
lated using a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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C US CEO Data
Data for US CEOs (and their firms) comes from the Execucomp and Compustat
databases. I use this data for the case study of CEO pay (Section 4) and as the
basis for the US hierarchy model (Section 5). Methods are discussed below.
Finding the CEO
I identify CEOs using titles in the Execucomp series TITLEANN. I use a three-step
algorithm:
1. Find all executives whose title contains one or more of the words in the
‘CEO Titles’ list in Table 12.
2. Of these executives, take the subset whose title does not contain any of
the words in the ‘Subordinate Titles’ list in Table 12.
3. If this returns more than one executive per firm per year, chose the ex-
ecutive with the highest pay.
Table 12: Titles Used to Identify the ‘CEO’
CEO Titles: Subordinate Titles
president vp
chairman v-p
CEO cfo
Chief Executive Officer vice
chmn chief finance officer
president of
coo
division
div
president-
group president
chairmain-
co-president
deputy chairman
pres.-
Chief Financial Officer
Titles such as ‘president-’ and ‘president of’ are included in the subordinate list because
they typically refer to a president of a division within the company: i.e. ‘president of
western division’ or ‘president-western hemisphere’.
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Table 13: Execucomp Compensation Series
Series Description
TOTAL_ALT2
SALARY + BONUS + OTHCOMP + NONEQ_INCENT +
PENSION_CHG + OPT_EXER_VAL + SHRS_VEST_VAL
BONUS
The dollar value of a bonus earned by the named executive officer
during the fiscal year.
SALARY
The dollar value of the base salary earned by the named executive
officer during the fiscal year.
OTHCOMP
Other compensation received by the director including perquisites
and other personal benefits, contributions to defined contribution
plans (e.g. 401K plans), life insurance premiums, gross-ups and
other tax reimbursements, discounted share purchases, consulting
fees, awards under charitable award programs, etc.
NONEQ_INCENT
Value of amounts earned during the year pursuant to non-equity
incentive plans.
PENSION_CHG
Composed of a) above-market or preferential earnings from
deferred compensation plans, and b) aggregate increase in actual
value of defined benefit and actual pension plans during the year.
OPT_EXER_VAL
Value realized from option exercises during the year. The value is
calculated as of the date of exercise and is based on the difference
between the exercise price and the market price of the stock on the
exercise date.
SHRS_VEST_VAL Value of restricted shares that vested during the year.
CEO Pay and Capitalist Income Fraction
Execucomp contains several different estimates of CEO pay. These differ primar-
ily in the valuation of stock option compensation. Hopkins and Lazonick (2016)
argue that we should use actual realized gains. This is the difference between
the market value of the option and the exercise value at the time of exercise.
Importantly, actual realized gains is the income recorded by the IRS for tax pur-
poses. I measure CEO total pay and capitalist income fraction (Kfrac) using the
following series:
Total Pay = TOTAL_ALT2 (10)
Kfrac =
Actual Realized Gains from Stock Options
Total Pay
(11)
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Kfrac =
SHRS_VEST_VAL+OPT_EXER_VAL
TOTAL_ALT2
(12)
Series descriptions are shown in Table 13.
CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Employment
I calculate the CEO pay ratio as:
CEO Pay Ratio =
CEO Pay
Firm Mean Income
(13)
Firm mean income is calculated by dividing total staff expenses (Compustat Se-
ries XLR) by total employment (Compustat Series EMP):
Firm Mean Income =
Total Staff Expenses
Total Employment
(14)
CEO pay ratio and firm mean income data are available for roughly 3000
firm-year observations from 2006-2016. Figure 18 shows summary statistics of
this data.
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Figure 18: Statistics of the CEO Firm Sample
This figure shows selected statistics of the CEO firm sample. Panel A shows the number
of firms in the sample over time, Panel B the average firm size, and Panel C the share
of US employment held by these firms. Panel D shows the logarithmic distribution of
firm size, and Panel E shows the logarithmic distribution of the CEO pay ratio. Panel
F shows the mean CEO pay ratio of all firms over time. Panel G shows the logarithmic
distribution of normalized mean pay (mean pay divided by the average pay of the firm
sample in each year). Panel H shows the ratio of mean pay in the sample relative to
the US average (calculated from BEA Table 1.12 by dividing the sum of employee and
proprietor income by the number of workers in BEA Table 6.8C-D. Panel I shows the
Gini index of firm mean pay over time.
Hierarchy Model Equations 53
D Hierarchy Model Equations
I discuss here the equations of the hierarchy model used in Section D. Based on
evidence from firm case studies (Section B), the model assumes the following:
1. Firms are hierarchically structured, with a span of control that increases
exponentially with hierarchical level.
2. The ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical levels increases ex-
ponentially with hierarchical level.
3. Income within hierarchical levels is lognormally distributed and does not
vary between levels.
I use these assumptions to create equations describing the hierarchical em-
ployment and pay structure of firms. For notation, see Table 14.
Table 14: Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
C CEO to average employee pay ratio
E employment
F cumulative distribution function
G Gini index of inequality
h hierarchical level
I¯ average income
µ lognormal location parameter
n number of hierarchical levels in a firm
p pay ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels
r pay-scaling parameter
s span of control
σ lognormal scale parameter
T total for firm
↓ round down to nearest integer∏
product of a sequence of numbers∑
sum of a sequence of numbers
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D.1 Generating the Employment Hierarchy
To generate the employment hierarchy of a firm, we begin by defining the span
of control (s). It is the average number of direct subordinates controlled by a
given individual. In the model, we define this as the ratio of employment (E)
between two consecutive hierarchical levels (h). We let h = 1 be the bottom
hierarchical level (bottom-ranked individuals). We define the span of control in
level 1 as s = 1. This leads to the following piecewise function:
sh ≡
 1 if h = 1Eh−1
Eh
if h≥ 2 (15)
Based on the firm case studies (Section B), we assume that the span of control
increases exponentially with hierarchical level, with a and b as free parameters:
sh =
(
1 if h = 1
a · ebh if h≥ 2 (16)
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh)
decreases by 1/sh. This yields Eq. 17, a recursive method for calculating Eh.
Since we want employment to be whole numbers, we round down to the nearest
integer (notated by ↓).
Eh =↓ Eh−1sh for h> 1 (17)
By repeatedly substituting Eq. 17 into itself, we can obtain a non-recursive for-
mula:
Eh =↓ E1 · 1s2 ·
1
s3
· ... · 1
sh
(18)
In product notation, Eq. 18 can be written as:
Eh =↓ E1
h∏
i=1
1
si
(19)
Total employment in the whole firm (ET ) is the sum of employment in all
hierarchical levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we get
Eq. 20, which in summation notation, becomes Eq. 21.
ET = E1 + E2 + ...+ En (20)
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ET =
n∑
h=1
Eh (21)
The model ‘builds’ the hierarchy from the bottom up. Therefore, n is not
known beforehand, so we define it using Eq. 19. We progressively increase h
until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest level n will be the hier-
archical level directly below the first hierarchical level with zero employment:
n = {h | Eh ≥ 1 and Eh+1 = 0} (22)
To summarize, the employment hierarchy of our model firm is determined
by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and base-level
employment E1. Code for this algorithm is located in exponents.h in the Sup-
plementary Material.
D.2 Generating Hierarchical Pay
To model the hierarchical pay, we begin by defining the inter-hierarchical pay-
ratio (ph). It is the ratio of mean income ( I¯) between adjacent hierarchical levels.
Again, it is helpful to use a piecewise function so that we can define a pay-ratio
for hierarchical level 1:
ph ≡
 1 if h = 1I¯h
I¯h−1
if h≥ 2 (23)
Based on the case-study evidence (Section B), we assume that the pay ratio
increases exponentially with hierarchical level. I model this with the following
function, where r is a free parameter:
ph =
(
1 if h = 1
rh if h≥ 2 (24)
Using the same logic as with the employment hierarchy, the mean income (Ih)
in any hierarchical level is defined recursively by Eq. 25 and non-recursively by
Eq. 26.
I¯h =
I¯h−1
ph
(25)
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I¯h = I¯1
h∏
i=1
pi (26)
To summarize, the pay hierarchy of our model firm is determined by 2 free
parameters: the pay-scaling parameter r, and mean pay in the base level ( I¯1).
Code for this algorithm is located in model.h in the Supplementary Material.
D.2.1 Useful Statistics
Two statistics are used repeatedly within the model: mean pay within the firm,
and the CEO-to-average-employee pay ratio.
Mean income for all employees ( I¯T ) is equal to the weighted average of in-
come by rank. It is the average of mean income in each hierarchical level ( I¯h),
weighted by the respective hierarchical level employment (Eh):
I¯T =
n∑
h=1
I¯h · EhET (27)
To calculate the CEO pay ratio, we define the CEO as the person(s) in the
top hierarchical level. Therefore, CEO pay is simply I¯n, average income in the
top hierarchical level. The CEO pay ratio (C) is then equal to CEO pay divided
by average pay:
C =
I¯n
I¯T
(28)
D.3 Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion
Up to this point, we have modeled only the mean income within each hierarchical
level of a firm. The last step is to add pay dispersion within each hierarchical
level.
I assume that pay dispersion within hierarchical levels is lognormally dis-
tributed. The lognormal distribution is defined by location parameter µ and
scale parameter σ. The case-study evidence (Section B) suggests that pay dis-
persion within hierarchical levels is relatively constant (see Fig. 16C). Thus, the
model assumes identical inequality within all hierarchical levels. This means that
the lognormal scale parameter σ is the same for all hierarchical levels.
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Figure 19: Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion to a Model Firm
This figure illustrates pay dispersion within a model firm. Colors show pay dispersion
within each hierarchical level. Panel A shows the income distributions for each level,
with means indicated by a dashed vertical line. Panel B shows the contribution of each
hierarchical level to the income distribution of the whole firm. Income density functions
are summed by weighting their respective employment. This firm has a pay-scaling
parameter of r = 1.2 and an intra-level Gini index of 0.13.
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To add dispersion within each hierarchical level, I multiply mean pay I¯h by a
lognormal random variate with an expected mean of one:
Ih = I¯h · lnN (µ,σ) (29)
The mean of a lognormal distribution is eµ+
1
2σ
2
. For the mean to be 1, µ must
be:
µ= −1
2
σ2 (30)
Given a value for σ (a free parameter), we can define the pay distribution
within any hierarchical level of a firm. This process is shown graphically in Fig-
ure 19. Figure 19A shows the income distributions for each hierarchical level of
a 5-level firm. Figure 19B shows the contribution of each hierarchical level to the
firm’s income distribution. Lower levels have more members and thus dominate
the distribution. Code for this algorithm is in model.h in the Supplementary
Material.
Calculating Hierarchical Power in the Hierarchy Model
I define an individual’s hierarchical power (P) as the number of subordinates
(S) under their control, plus 1:
P = S + 1 (31)
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of firms
(employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as an av-
erage per rank. For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (P¯h) is
defined as the average number of subordinates (S¯h) plus 1:
P¯h = S¯h + 1 (32)
Within each rank, every individual is assigned the average power P¯h. The
average number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all
subordinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question:
S¯h =
h−1∑
i=1
Ei
Eh
(33)
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Figure 20: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
As an example, consider the hierarchy in Figure 20. The average number of
subordinates below each individual in hierarchical level 3 (red) is:
S¯3 =
E1 + E2
E3
=
16+ 8
4
= 6 (34)
Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
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E The United States Hierarchy Model
I review here the technical details of the US hierarchy model. The model uses
the hierarchy algorithms from Section D and applies them to the United States.
The model’s parameters are summarized in Table 15. The technical structure of
the model is summarized in Table 16.
The model has three main steps. First, it uses firm case-study data and CEO
pay-ratio data to simulate the hierarchical structure within CEOs’ firms. Second,
the model generalizes this simulation to a firm size distribution that is repre-
sentative of the US. Third, the model assigns a class component to individual
income.
E.1 Step 1. Simulate the Hierarchical Structure of CEOs’ Firms
The first step of the hierarchy model is to simulate the hierarchical structure
of our sample of CEOs’ firms (Section C). To build the employment hierarchy,
the model assumes CEOs’ firms have the same hierarchical ‘shape’ as firm case
Table 15: Parameters in the US Hierarchy Model
Parameter Definition Action Scope
α
Power-law exponent for the size
distribution of firms
Determines the skewness of the firm size
distribution
—
a, b Span of control parameters
Determines the shape of the firm
hierarchy.
Identical for all firms.
E1
Employment in base hierarchical
level
Used to build the employment hierarchy
from the bottom up. Determines total
employment.
Specific to each firm.
r Pay-scaling parameter
Determines the rate at which mean
income (within a firm) increases by
hierarchical level.
Specific to each firm.
I¯h
Mean pay in base hierarchical
level
Sets the base level income of the firm,
which determines firm average pay.
Specific to each firm.
σ
Within-rank pay dispersion
parameter
Determines the level of inequality within
hierarchical ranks of a firm.
Identical for all firms.
κ Capitalist gradient parameter
Determines how rapidly the capitalist
fraction of income increases with
hierarchical power
Identical for all
individuals.
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Figure 21: Uncertainty in the Span of Control Parameters
This figure shows the uncertainty in the span-of-control parameters a and b. Together,
these parameters determine the ‘shape’ of the firm hierarchy. These parameters are
determined from regressions on firm case-study data (Fig. 16). I estimate uncertainty
using the bootstrap technique.
studies (Section B). The model then uses the empirical CEO pay ratio to infer
the pay hierarchy within each CEO firm.
E.1.1 The Employment Hierarchy of CEOs’ Firms
The model assumes that all CEO firms have the same hierarchical shape as the
average shape found in firm case studies (Fig. 17). This shape is determined by
the span of control parameters a and b, which are estimated from an exponential
regression on case-study data (Fig. 16A). The model assumes these parameters
are constant for all firms, meaning all firms have the same hierarchical shape.
Because there are only six firms in the case-study sample, there is significant
uncertainty in the values of a and b. I incorporate this uncertainty into the
model using the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). I repeatedly
resample the case-study data (with replacement) and estimate the parameters a
and b for each resample. Figure 21 shows the resulting uncertainty in a and b.
I include this uncertainty in the model by using a different resample of a and b
in each iteration. Code implementing this bootstrap is located in boot_span.h
in the Supplementary Material.
After receiving parameters a and b from a bootstrap sample, the model con-
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Figure 22: Fitting CEOs’ Firms with a Pay-Scaling Parameter
This figure shows the fitted pay-scaling parameters (r) for all CEOs’ firms. This param-
eter determines how rapidly income increases with hierarchical rank. Panel A shows
the relation between the CEO pay ratio, firm size, and r. The discrete changes in color
(evident as vertical lines) correspond to changes in the number of hierarchical levels
within firms. The distribution of r for all firms (and years) is shown in panel B.
structs the employment hierarchy of each CEO firm. The input empirical data is
the firm’s total employment. The model constructs the employment hierarchy
from the bottom up. To do this, it needs to first estimate employment in the
base level of each CEO firm. I use the model to reverse engineer this calcula-
tion. I input a range of different base-employment values into equations 16, 19,
and 21 and calculate total employment for each value. The result is a discrete
mapping relating base employment to total employment. I then interpolate be-
tween these values to create a continuous function that predicts base level E1,
given total employment ET . I use this equation to infer base-level employment
in each CEO firm. Code implementing this method is located in base_fit.h in
the Supplementary Material.
Once we have base-level employment in each CEO firm, the model uses Eqs.
16, 19, and 21 to simulate the employment hierarchy of each CEO firm.
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E.1.2 The Pay Hierarchy in CEOs’ Firms
The model’s next step is to infer the pay hierarchy for each CEO firm. Unlike
the employment hierarchy, the model allows the pay hierarchy to vary between
firms. We assume that hierarchical pay obeys Eqs. 24 and 26, meaning it is
determined by the pay-scaling parameter r.
Once the employment hierarchy is set for each CEO firm, r can be estimated
from the empirical CEO pay ratio. To solve for r, I use the bisection method to
minimize the following error function:
ε(r) =
 Cmodel − Cempirical (35)
Here Cmodel and CCEO are modeled and empirical CEO pay ratios, respectively.
For each firm, we choose r that minimizes the error function. To ensure that
there are no large errors, I discard CEO firms for which the best-fit r parameter
gives an error larger than ε = 0.01. Figure 22 shows an example of the fitted
results for r. Every bootstrap iteration will return slightly different values for r.
Once we have estimated r for each CEO firm, we can estimate pay in the
base hierarchical level. To do this, we set up a ratio between base-level pay ( I¯1)
and firm mean pay ( I¯T ) for both the model and empirical data:
I¯ empirical1
I¯empiricalT
=
I¯ model1
I¯ modelT
(36)
The modeled ratio I¯ model1 / I¯
model
T is independent of the choice of base pay. This
is because firm mean pay in the model is a function of base pay (see Eq. 26 and
27). If we run the model with I¯ model1 = 1, then Eq. 36 reduces to:
I¯ empirical1
I¯ empiricalT
=
1
I¯ modelT
(37)
We then rearrange Eq. 37 to estimate base pay for each CEO firm ( I¯ empirical1 ):
I¯ empirical1 =
I¯ empiricalT
I¯ modelT
(38)
Note that the CEO firm data contains observations over multiple years. To ad-
just for inflation, I divide firm mean pay by the sample average in the given year.
Code implementing this fitting method for I¯1 and r is located in fit_model.h
in the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 23: The United States Firm Size Distribution as a Power Law
This figure compares the firm size distribution in the United States to a discrete power-
law distribution with exponent α = 2.01. The US data combines ‘employer’ firms and
unincorporated self-employed workers. Data for ‘employer’ firms is from the US Census
Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses (using data for 2013). This data is augmented
with Bureau of Labor Statistics data for unincorporated self-employed workers (series
LNU02032185 and LNU02032192). The histogram preserves firm-size bins used by the
Census. I add self-employed individuals to the first bin. The last histogram bin contains
all firms with more than 10,000 employees.
E.2 Step 2: Simulate the Whole US Firm Population
In step 2, the model takes the CEO firm simulation and extrapolates it to a firm
size distribution that is consistent with the US. Rather than the lognormal dis-
tribution found in CEO firms (Fig. 18D), step 2 uses a power-law distribution of
firm sizes.
The model generates a power-law sample of firms and then simulates their
hierarchical structure. This involves fitting probability distributions to the pa-
rameters that were estimated in step 1. The model then uses these parameter
distributions to simulate the pay hierarchy within the power-law sample of firms.
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E.2.1 Create A Representative Size Distribution of Firms
In the CEO sample, firm size is lognormally distributed (Fig. 18D). Unfortu-
nately, this is not representative of the United States. Recent studies suggest
that in the US and other G7 countries, the firm size distribution follows a power
law (Axtell, 2001; Gaffeo et al., 2003). In a power-law distribution, the proba-
bility of finding a firm of size x is:
p(x)∝ 1
xα
(39)
The exponent α determines how skewed the distribution is. Figure 23 com-
pares the US firm size distribution to a power law. Although not perfect, the
fit is good enough for modeling purposes. I model the US firm size distribution
using a discrete power-law distribution with α= 2.01.
A characteristic property of power-law distributions is that as α approaches
2, the average becomes undefined. This means that the hierarchy model can pro-
duce firm sizes that are extremely large — far beyond anything that exists in the
real world. To stop this from happening, I truncate the power-law distribution
at a maximum firm size of 2.3 million. This is the present size of Walmart, the
largest US firm that has ever existed.
Code for the discrete power law random number generator can be found in
rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material. This code is an adaptation of
Collin Gillespie’s (2014) discrete power law generator found in the R poweRlaw
package. Gillespie’s generator is, in turn, an adaptation of the algorithm outlined
by Clauset (2009).
E.2.2 Simulate the Employment Hierarchy
As in step 1, the employment hierarchy in modeled firms is assumed to be the
same as the average in case-study firms (Fig. 17). But rather than receive CEO
firm-size data as an input, the model now receives simulated data from a power
law. All other steps for generating the employment hierarchy are then the same
as in step 1.
E.2.3 Simulate the Distribution of Base-Level Pay
The next step is to simulate the hierarchical pay structure of each firm. To do
this, we need to know the distribution of base-level pay. In step 1, we estimated
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Figure 24: Modeling the Distribution of Base Pay in CEOs’ Firms
This figure shows the distribution of (fitted) pay in the base level of CEO’s firms. Pay
is normalized so that the average income in the CEO sample (in each year) is 1. To
extrapolate this data, I fit it with a gamma distribution. I do not attempt to replicate
the bimodal structure of the CEO data, since it is likely not representative of the general
firm population. The lower mode is composed mostly of chain restaurants, which seem
to be over-represented in this sample.
base-level pay in each CEO firm. In step 2, we fit a probability distribution to
this data so that we can extrapolate it (Fig. 24).
I model the base-pay distribution in CEOs’ firms with a gamma distribution.
Because the CEO data has a bimodal structure, the gamma distribution is not a
particularly strong fit, but it is better than other parameterized distributions. I
do not attempt to replicate the bimodal structure of the CEO data because I feel
it is not representative of the US firm population. The lower mode in CEO data is
composed mostly of chain restaurants, which seem to be over-represented in this
sample. While the shape of the fit is not great, the gamma distribution closely
replicates the dispersion of base pay in the CEO sample. It reproduces the Gini
index of roughly 0.35.
In each iteration, the model fits a gamma distribution to the CEO data. The
model then samples from this distribution to simulate base pay in each firm
generated by the power-law distribution. Code implementing this method is
The United States Hierarchy Model 67
located in base_pay_sim.h in the Supplementary Material.
E.2.4 Simulate the Distribution of Hierarchical Pay
In step 1, we fitted the parameter r to each CEO firm. This parameter determines
how rapidly income increases with hierarchical rank. In step 2, we extrapolate
this information to a power-law sample of firms. To do this we fit the CEO
distribution of r with a probability distribution. But unlike with base pay, the
distribution of r depends on firm size.
As shown in Figure 25A, the dispersion in CEO r declines with firm size. I
model this dispersion using the lognormal variate r0:
r = 1+ lnN (r0) (40)
Here r0 depends on firm size:
r0(E) = lnN (r0;µ,σE) (41)
The parameter of interest is σE. This determines the dispersion in r0 for a
given firm size E. To model r, we need to know how σE varies with firm size.
To measure this, we first transform CEO r values using:
r0 = r − 1 (42)
This gives the CEO distribution of r0. We estimate µ using:
µ= ln(r0) (43)
We then estimate σE by taking the standard deviation of ln(r0). But because σE
varies by firm size (E), we calculate σE on groups of firms binned by firm size:
σE = SD [ ln(r0) ]E (44)
Figure 25B plots σE vs. firm size for log-spaced bins of CEO firms. As ex-
pected, σE declines with firm size. I model this relation as:
σE ∝− log(E) (45)
Using this function, Figure 25C shows how the modeled dispersion in r0 varies
with firm size.
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Figure 25: Modeling the Hierarchical Pay-Scaling Parameter
This figure visualizes the algorithm used to model the distribution of the parameter r.
This parameter determines how rapidly income increases with hierarchical rank. Panel
A shows the relation between r and firm employment within CEO firms. I simulate this
relation using the lognormal variate r0 (Eq. 41), which has a scale parameter σE that
varies by firm size. Using Eq. 44, Panel B estimatesσE for CEO firms. Each dot indicates
σE for the given firm-size bin. The straight line indicates the modeled relation. Panel
C shows how the modeled dispersion of ln(r0) declines with firm size, and how this
relates to CEO r0 data. The 2σ range indicates 2 standard deviations from the mean
(on log-transformed data). Panel D compares the distribution of r for CEO firms to the
simulated distribution created by applying the model to the same CEO firms.
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After estimating µ and σE from CEO data, the model uses Eq. 40 and 41
to determine r for each simulated firm (drawn from a power-law distribution).
To test the accuracy of this algorithm, we can apply it back to CEO firms. For
each CEO firm, we use the above algorithm to randomly generate values for r.
As Figure 25D shows, the resulting distribution of r accurately reproduces the
original data.
When we move from simulating CEO firms to a power-law distribution of
firms, we undertake a significant extrapolation. This is because the CEO firm
sample poorly represents small firms, so we have very little idea how r behaves
among this small-firm population. As with all extrapolations, we do the best we
can with the available data.
The code implementing this model is located in r_sim.h in the Supplemen-
tary Material.
E.2.5 Income Dispersion Within Hierarchical Ranks of Each Firm
So far, the model has simulated average pay by hierarchical rank. The last step
is to add pay dispersion within ranks. To do this, we return to our firm case
studies. Figure 16C shows the Gini index within each rank of each case-study
firm. The model aims to replicate this data.
I model income dispersion within hierarchical ranks using a lognormal vari-
ate. The parameter σ determines the amount of inequality. The model assumes
thatσ is constant for all hierarchical ranks within all firms. The model estimates
σ from case-study data. It first calculates G¯ — the average Gini index of income
dispersion within ranks. It then calculates the σ that would produce G¯:
σ = 2 · erf−1(G¯) (46)
This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a lognormal
distribution: G = erf(σ/2).
Because the case-study sample size is small, there is considerable uncertainty
in σ. I quantify this uncertainty using the bootstrap method (Efron and Tib-
shirani, 1994). For each model iteration, I sample the case-study data (with
replacement) and then estimate the parameter σ from this resampled data. Fig-
ure 26 shows the uncertainty in σ. Code implementing this method is located
in boot_sigma.h in the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 26: Uncertainty in the Parameter σ
This figure shows the uncertainty in the lognormal scale parameterσ, which determines
pay dispersion within all hierarchical levels of all firms. The uncertainty is calculated
using the bootstrap method.
E.3 Step 3: Simulate the Class Composition of Individual Income
The last step of the hierarchy model is to assign class components to individual
income. The model does so by simulating the relation between income size
and class found among US CEOs (Fig. 8A). The capitalist fraction of individual
income (Kfrac) is modeled as a function of hierarchical power (P):
Kfrac = κ log(P) (47)
The capitalist gradient parameter κ determines the rate of this scaling and
is fixed by regressions on CEO data. The model defines the labor fraction of
individuals’ income (Lfrac) as the complement of the capitalist fraction:
Lfrac = 1− Kfrac (48)
Code implementing this method is located in k_func.h in the Supplemen-
tary Material.
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Table 16: Structure of the Hierarchy Model
Step Action Reference Section Parameter(s) File(s)
1.1 Bootstrap firm case-study data E.1.1, E.2.5 a, b, σ
boot_span.h
boot_sigma.h
1.2
Estimate base-level
employment in CEOs’ firms
E.1.1 E1 base_fit.h
1.3
Fit hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter for each CEO firm
E.1.2 r fit_model.h
1.4
Estimate base-level pay in each
CEO firm
E.1.2 I1 fit_model.h
2.1
Generate a firm size
distribution that follows a
power law
E.2.1 α rpld.h
2.2
Estimate base-level
employment in each simulated
firm
E.1.1 E1 base_fit.h
2.3
Model the distribution of
base-level pay. Assign a value
to each simulated firm
E.2.3 I1 base_pay_sim.h
2.4
Model the distribution of the
hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter. Assign a value to
each simulated firm
E.2.4 r r_sim.h
2.5 Run hierarchy model D all but κ model.h
3
Assign class composition to
individual income
E.3 κ k_func.h
Notes: Model code makes extensive use of Armadillo, an open-source linear algebra
library for C++ (Sanderson and Curtin, 2016).
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